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1 Introduction
We explore the effects of social infrastructure on the preservation of physical capital and, con-
sequently, on economic growth. This is an unexplored link in the theory of economic growth,
even within the literature that relates institutions to growth. In fact, social infrastructure can be
associated with the existence of institutions, formal and/or informal in nature, that may help to
decrease corruption, rent seeking, and cheating while improving transparency and trust in the
economic environment of a country, facilitating the preservation of the existing physical capital
stock, and enhancing economic growth.
The role of institutions on the economic performance of countries acquired such a relevance
that it gave rise to a new branch in economics, designated by “institutional economics”, which
was born with the seminal work of North (1990), among others. Empirical work has emphasized
the important contribution of good institutions to economic growth and development, and there
is an important consensus on this conclusion, as we can see in the work of Hall and Jones (1999),
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kray (2003), and Rodrik
et al. (2004). In this study we follow this consensual view and assume that good institutions
contribute to economic growth. However, we go further and consider that the channel is through
the protection of physical capital or investment. In fact, empirical literature has found a negative
relation between corruption levels and capital accumulation (Campos and Lien, 1999), corrup-
tion and productivity (Salinas-Jime´nez and Salinas-Jime´nez, 2007), social barriers and capital
accumulation (Grafton et al., 2007), and social capital and corruption (Bjørnskov, 2003a); it
also found a positive relationship between governance institutions and investment (Aysan et al.,
2007), responsibility and capital accumulation (Breuer andMcDermott, 2009), and trust and cap-
ital accumulation (Yamamura and Inyong, 2010). Closer to our work, Bu (2006) presented evi-
dence according to which depreciation rates are higher in developing countries than in developed
ones. According to the author and references therein, some of the explanations may be related to
greater risk of expropriation, higher uncertainty on future returns from investments, lower main-
tenance expenditures in those countries, associated with greater corruption, e.g. factors linked
with institutions. For instance, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) showed that higher corruption is as-
sociated with lower expenditures on operations and maintenance of physical capital, which calls
for a relationship between institutions and the depreciation of physical capital, exactly the link
that we uncover.
There is a related extensive literature on the importance of institutions in the realm of evo-
lutionary game theory. A very detailed and recent survey is Perc et al. (2017). In this literature
the interaction behaviour of different individuals is analyzed within game theoretical framework
(other examples are Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012 and Szolnoki and Perc, 2015). Because different
possibilities emerge from different behaviours (e.g. free-riding, cooperative), then multiple states
may arise. In this sense there is a parallel between that literature and our contribution, although
we place ours in more aggregated terms.
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We define institutions as being associated with the concept of social infrastructure as in the
work of Hall and Jones (1999, pp.84). For these authors social infrastructure is composed by
”...institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within which
individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output”. We use this
definition of institutions in a broad sense, including both formal and informal institutions. While
formal institutions include constitutional constraints, statutory rules, property rights, rule of law,
and other political and legal constraints; informal institutions arise from norms, culture, and
customs, emerging spontaneously (Williamson, 2009). But formal institutions can contribute to
economic growth only if they incorporate some of the principles established and agreed upon by
informal institutions. This definition of informal institutions proposed by Williamson (2009) is
closely related to the concept of social capital, as well as the notions of social infrastructure and
trustworthy institutions.1 The notions of social capital and its most commonly used empirical
proxy, trust, are related, and work as a substitute for the notion of property rights (Aharonovitz
et al., 2009). There is a growing empirical literature relating institutions, social capital, and
economic growth, namely Knack and Keefer (1997), Cuesta (2004), Beugelsdjik and van Schaik
(2005), and Bjørnskov (2010), among others, pointing to a positive association between the men-
tioned variables, but still presenting diffuse results. In a model of endogenous growth, Strulik
(2008) studies how social fractionalization and aggressiveness affect economic growth and show
that civil conflict deters it.
In our work we focus on the positive role of institutions (social infrastructure) in preventing
the depreciation of physical capital, a role that earlier empirical studies have uncovered, but that
theory has so far neglected. We build an endogenous growth model with both physical and hu-
man capital accumulation in which we incorporate the important role of social infrastructure in
facilitating physical capital preservation. Our main goal is to study an economic environment in
which this feature is incorporated, focusing on the steady-state features and the transition path
of the economy to the steady-state. The model will also allow us to access the consequences
of increasing this preservation effect both in transition and in equilibrium. The precise mecha-
nisms according to which social infrastructure influences output (and hence economic growth)
are underexplored in the literature.2
We fill this gap, proposing specific mechanisms according to which social infrastructure in-
fluences output by its direct effect on physical capital preservation. In the model, social infras-
tructure is modelled as a particular type of human capital allocation consisting of hours spent
in several activities such as: petitions, influence groups, participation in informal networks that
spread information, etc., i.e., activities of civic and community participation, which help to im-
1North (1990) and Knowles (2006) also emphasized the importance of informal institutions. Knowles (2006)
relates the concepts of informal institutions and social capital, claiming that they are very similar. Berggren and Jor-
dahl (2008) find an empirical positive relationship between the existence of a good legal structure and property rights
(formal institutions in our definition) and the level of trust in economies (informal institutions in our definition).
2Chin and Chou (2004) also model social infrastructure in a growth model, but in their model this variable
affects the division of time between productive and non-productive activities. In our model it affects physical
capital accumulation.
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prove the level of civic rights, property rights, law and order, and ultimately the social infras-
tructure of a country. Through these effects social infrastructure reduces the incentive for rent
seeking, corruption, predation, and cheating, and thus helps to preserve the existing physical
capital stock of the economy. We analyze the economic consequences of such mechanisms.
To this end and given the structure of the model, involving four variables, four equations and
seven parameters, we use an innovative method of algebraic geometry in the economics field,
recently proposed by Kubler and Schmedders (2010a, 2010b), to study the existence and multi-
plicity of steady-states’ solutions and equilibria - the Gro¨bner bases. The solution of economic
growth models is often characterized as a set of multivariate parameterized polynomial equa-
tions, resulting from setting growth rates of stationary variables to zero. Finding all steady-states
of the model is thus equivalent to being able to solve the corresponding polynomial system. In
many cases, as referred by Kubler and Schmedders (2010a), standard numerical methods only
search for a single equilibrium. Moreover, determining all solutions of a parameterized system
of polynomial equations is sometimes hard to compute and the usual techniques either use nu-
merical approximations or give us a general solution too complex to handle and analyze. In
the last 30 years, computational algebraic geometry has seen considerable advances in meth-
ods that solve polynomial systems. The method of Gro¨bner bases is a powerful example of this
progress. Kubler and Schmedders use them to study the multiplicity of equilibria (see Kubler and
Schmedders, 2010a), and to compute the equilibrium correspondence for exchange economies
with semi-algebraic preferences (see Kubler and Schmedders, 2010b). Gro¨bner bases’ algorithm
allow us to find all solutions of a polynomial system of equilibrium equations. But, more sig-
nificantly, all computations are exact without rounding errors provided all coefficients in the
equations are rational numbers or parameters. This will give us the possibility of proving the ex-
act number of equilibria of the given economic model. Thus our contribution is twofold. First we
consider a neglected channel through which institutions contribute to growth in an endogenous
growth model and analyze its consequences. Second, we use a novel computational algebraic
method to characterize the steady-states in endogenous growth literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In this Section, Subsection 1.1 presents some empir-
ical evidence that motivates the paper. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the
main results concerning steady-state equilibrium and its (local) stability. Section 4 presents sim-
ulation results for the transitional dynamics of the model when the effect of social infrastructure
in investment is increased. In Section 5 we conclude.
1.1 Some Empirical Motivation
We present empirical motivation for the relationship between social infrastructure and the accu-
mulation of physical capital (investment). For that purpose we found two proxies that could be
interpreted as social infrastructure: The Social Capital Index of the Prosperity Index from the
Legatum Institute and the Social Capital Index from Hall and Jones (1999).
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Figure 1: Relationship between Social Capital and Investment
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the Social Capital Index 2010 from the Prosper-
ity Index from the Legatum Institute and the Social Capital Index from Hall and Jones (1999)
and Investment per capita, for about 120 countries.3 Both panels in the figure show a posi-
tive relationship between Investment and Social Capital (with partial correlations above 0.74),
empirically supporting the theoretical modelling followed in this paper, i.e., modelling social
infrastructure as a positive effect over physical capital investment.
2 Model
We build an endogenous model of economic growth with both physical and human capital ac-
cumulation in which we incorporate the important role of social infrastructure in facilitating
physical capital preservation. Human capital has different uses: it is employed in the production
of the final good, in school attendance, which is the main input to the accumulation of new hu-
man capital, and it is also employed in the formation of social infrastructure. Physical capital is
used in the production of the final good and social infrastructure facilitates the preservation of
physical capital by decreasing its depreciation.
A crucial feature of the model is that there is no market for social infrastructure. Social in-
frastructure arises from the civic engagement of people and as a result provides utility. Also,
households can help build and improve social infrastructure through allocating time to activi-
ties of civic and community participation. This follows the notion of bonding social capital in
Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2009).
3The Social Capital Index 2010 was taken from the Legatum Institute website (http://www.prosperity.com/) and
data for Investment (per capita and share of GDP in constant 2005 prices) were taken from the Penn World Tables,
version 7.0.
4For both linear and polynomial adjustments.
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2.1 Production Factors and Final Goods
2.1.1 Capital Accumulation
Individual human capital can be divided into skills allocated to different activities (as in Lucas,
1988). Thus, skills can be allocated to the final good production (HY ), to school attendance (HH),
and to the building and improving of social infrastructure (HS). Assuming that the different
human capital activities are not done cumulatively, we have:
KH = HY +HH +HS. (2.1)
This restriction can be written in shares of human capital utilization as 1 = uY + uH + uS, with
uY = HY/KH , uH = HH/KH and uS = HS/HY .
As in the literature that began with Arnold (1998), in this model human capital is the “ulti-
mate” source of growth. To have endogenous growth, one should have non-decreasing returns
in the human capital production function, regardless of the inputs to human capital that are con-
sidered. Human capital KH is accumulated using human capital allocated to school attendance
according to:
˙KH = ξHH (2.2)
where ξ > 0 is a parameter that measures productivity in school attendance.
The accumulation of physical capital (KP) arises through production that is not consumed,
and is subject to depreciation:
˙KP = Y −C−δP
(
1−σ HS
KH
)
KP (2.3)
where Y denotes production of final goods, C is consumption, δP represents depreciation of
physical capital, σ is the effect of social infrastructure in decreasing physical capital deprecia-
tion, and HSKH = uS is the share of human capital in building and improving social infrastructure.
We support our formalization on the work of Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Bu (2006). Note that
the constraint σuS < 1 must be satisfied to allow for a positive depreciation of physical capital.5
2.1.2 Final Good Production
The final good is a homogeneous one, produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Y = KβPH
1−β
Y , 0 < β < 1 (2.4)
where β is the share of physical capital in the final good production. If we substitute this equation
into (2.3) physical capital is accumulated according to ∙KP =KβPH1−βY −C−δP(1−σuS)KP. This
5As we discuss above, we consider that social infrastructure is acting in order to preserve physical capital,
decreasing its net depreciation rate. However, we would obtain similar results if we considered a direct and positive
effect of social infrastructure on investment.
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means that the output-capital ratio can be written as YKP =
(
HY
KP
)1−β
=
(
KH
KP
)1−β
u
1−β
Y . Renaming
vH = KHKP , we obtain:
Y
KP
= (vHuY )
1−β (2.5)
Similarly, we define uC = CKP .
The markets for purchased production factors are assumed to be competitive. However, we
assume that the firm cannot buy social infrastructure, as there is, in effect, no market for it. Social
infrastructure is treated here as exogenous for the firm, although it affects the accumulation of
physical capital.
From this problem we know that returns on production are as follows:
WH =
(1−β )Y
HY
(2.6)
r =
βY
KP
(2.7)
whereWH is the market wage of workers and r is the rate of return of physical capital.
2.2 Consumers
We assume that households benefit directly from socializing, specifically engaging in civic activ-
ities. This follows the concept of bonding (as, for example, in Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2009).
Hence, household preferences specify time spent in building and improving social infrastructure,
along with consumption, as arguments of the intertemporal utility function:
U(Ct ,HSt ) =
τ
τ−1
∞∫
0
(
CtHψSt
) τ−1
τ e−ρtdt (2.8)
where ψ represents the preference for social infrastructure and ρ is the utility discount rate.6
In the market economy both consumers and firms make choices that maximize, respectively,
their own utility or profits.7 Consumers maximize their intertemporal utility function subject to
the budget constraint:
.
a = (r−δp(1−σus))a+WH (KH −HH −HS)−C (2.9)
where a represents the household’s physical assets. The market price for the consumption good
is normalized to 1. Since it is making an intertemporal choice, the household also takes into
account equation (2.2), i.e., human capital accumulation.
6The t subscripts are dropped hereinafter for ease of notation.
7In this section we are working with variables for individual consumers.
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The choice variables for the consumers are C, HH , and HS, so the first-order conditions for
the consumer problem yield:
∂U
∂C = λa (2.10)
ξλH = λaWH (2.11)
∂U
∂HS
= λaWH (2.12)
as well as:
˙λa
λa
= ρ+δP(1−σus)− r (2.13)
˙λH
λH
= ρ−ξ (2.14)
where λa is the co-state variable for the budget constraint and λH is the co-state variable for the
stocks of human capital. Finally ∂U∂C =C
−1/τHψ
τ−1
τ
S and
∂U
∂HS = ψC
τ−1
τ Hψ
τ−1
τ −1
S .
The transversality conditions are: lim
t→∞λaae
−ρt = 0 and lim
t→∞λHKHe
−ρt = 0.
2.3 The Economy Dynamics
Using (2.10), (2.13), (2.5), and (2.3), we obtain guC :
guC = (τ−1)ψguS +(τ−1)ψξ (1−uY )− (1− τβ )(uY vH)1−β +
+(1− τ)δP +uC− ((τ−1)ψξ +(1− τ)σδP)uS− τρ . (2.15)
Resorting to (2.2), (2.1), and (2.3), the expression for gvH becomes:
gvH = ξ (1−uY )− (uY vH)1−β +uC +δP− (ξ +σδP)uS (2.16)
From (2.11) and (2.6), we obtain the growth rate of uY :
guY = 1/β
˙λa
λa
+gKP−1/β
˙λH
λH
−ξ (1−uY −uS) (2.17)
and from (2.13) and (2.14) we reach:
guY =
δP
β (1−σuS)− (uY vH)
1−β + ξβ +gKP−ξ (1−uY −uS). (2.18)
Replacing gKP by its expression (2.3), we then obtain:
guY =
(
1
β −1
)
δP(1−σuS)−ξ (1−uY −uS)−uC + ξβ . (2.19)
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Finally, from (2.11) and (2.12), we compute ψC τ−1τ Hψ
τ−1
τ −1
S = λaWH . Using (2.10) and (2.6) we
obtain uS = ψ1−β
C
Y uY , which is easily converted into the static equation:
uS =
ψ
1−β
uC
(uY vH)
1−β uY (2.20)
We now have a system of three differential equations on uC, uY , and vH with a static equation
on uS, which, using z = v1−βH u
1−β
Y , can be written as:
guC = (τ−1)ψguS +(τ−1)ψξ (1−uY )− (1− τβ )z+
+(1− τ)δP +uC− ((τ−1)ψξ +(1− τ)σδP)uS− τρ
gvH = ξ (1−uY )− z+uC +δP− (ξ +σδP)uS
guY =
(
1
β −1
)
δP(1−σuS)−ξ (1−uY −uS)−uC + ξβ (2.21)
uS =
ψuC
(1−β )z/uY
3 Steady-State
In this section, we study the long term properties of the growth model conceptualized above.
To approach the main steady-state features, an incursion into the Gro¨bner bases technique is
required. Let R[x1, . . . ,xn] be the ring of polynomials in n variables xi with coefficients in the
field of real numbers R. The main idea behind the Gro¨bner bases technique is the following:
given a set ϒ of polynomials in R[x1, . . . ,xn] that describes the problem in hand, one transforms
ϒ into another set Φ of polynomials of much simpler form, called a Gro¨bner basis, such that
ϒ and Φ are “equivalent”, i.e., they have the same set of solutions. Thus, difficult problems
for general ϒ become “easier” for Gro¨bner basis Φ. For linear polynomials, the Gro¨bner bases
algorithm specializes to Gauss’ algorithm, whereas for univariate polynomials it specializes to
Euclid’s algorithm.8
One of the main advantages of this algorithm is that we can compute Gro¨bner bases for
parameterized polynomials. Furthermore, all computations are exact provided all coefficients in
the equations are rational numbers or parameters. In particular, one can compute the number of
equilibria for entire classes of economic models (or bounds for this number), search for specific
parameter values for which there are multiple equilibria, or prove that equilibria are unique for
all parameter values in a given set. However, one must be aware that there may exist some
parameters for which the corresponding Gro¨bner basis obtained is not the correct one. More
precisely, Gro¨bner bases behave nicely for most (but not all) values of the parameters in the
8For the basic definitions and concepts on algebraic geometry and Gro¨bner bases Kubler and Schmedders
(2010a,b) provide an introduction to this subject. We refer the reader to the textbook Cox et al. (1997) for more
profound reading on this topic.
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following sense: there is a proper subvariety z ⊂ Rm (where m is the number of parameters of
the system) such that the Gro¨bner basis obtained is the same when the parameters take values in
Rm−z (see Cox et al., 1997, Chapter 6, §3). In the present work we compute this subvarietyW
in order to give a complete study of our model. We thus use a different approach from the one in
Kubler and Schmedders (2010a) (see section 2.5).
To obtain a Gro¨bner basis for the system that defines our model we have used the free com-
puter algebra system SINGULAR (Decker et al., 2012), considered as one of the best software for
Gro¨bner bases computations. We note that one can also find Gro¨bner bases’ packages in other
computer systems.
The system characterizing the decentralized equilibrium is a parameterized system of four
variables, four equations, and seven parameters. As explained above, the Gro¨bner bases’ method
allows us to simplify the system. Even so, the analysis of this simpler system still involves seven
parameters and it is obvious that any general solution will be too complex to analyze and will
lead us to inconclusive results.
In order to obtain a sensible analysis of the steady-state, we must calibrate our model with
sensible values for the parameters, usually used in endogenous growth theory and keep free
the most important parameters linked with social infrastructure, the focus of our paper. Some
parameters in our model are quite standard in the literature: the intertemporal substitution pa-
rameter (τ = 0.5), the intertemporal discount factor (ρ = 0.02), and the share of physical capital
in income (β = 0.36), so we shall not discuss them. For other parameters there are a range of
plausible values, although most of them present typical values that are most used in the literature:
the depreciation rate (δP), which we set to be 0.05 and the productivity of school attendance (ξ ),
which we set to be 0.05. We begin by studying steady-state solutions in which we calibrate all
the parameters except those directly related with social infrastructure, ψ and σ , which we keep
free. We then move from this general approach to more specific solutions in which we calibrate
ψ and allow the parameter that governs the impact of social infrastructure on investment − σ−,
the main mechanism analyzed in this paper, to be free. We assume that the weight the consumer
attributes to social infrastructure is lower that the weight attributed to consumption, thus we im-
plement solutions with ψ equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. For example, with ψ = 0.1, the consumer
weights social capital just at 10% the weight he attributes to consumption; with ψ = 0.9, the
consumer weights social capital at 90% the weight he attributes to consumption. This parameter
should be regarded as the theorectical counterpart of the estimated elasticity of life satisfaction
towards social capital. For example, Bjørnskov (2003b) estimated values around 0.5 and Elgar
et al. (2011) estimated values around 0.1. We base on these estimates to choose our values. We
add a higher value for comparison.
At this point we would like to stress that if one seeks to solve the resulting 2-parameter system
with standard techniques with the help of a conventional system, the general solution obtained
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is too complex to handle and study. Nevertheless, the use of the Gro¨bner bases algorithm will
allow us to determine all equilibria of our model.9
3.1 Steady-State for Free Social Infrastructure Parameters (ψ and σ )
The system of equations describing the decentralized equilibrium (2.21) when all parameters but
ψ and σ are calibrated is:
uC +(0.025ψ−0.025σ)uS +(0.025ψ)uY −0.82z−0.025ψ+0.015 = 0
uC− (0.05+0.05σ)uS−0.05uY − z+0.1 = 0
uC +(4/45σ −0.05)uS−0.05uY −8/45 = 0
ψuCuY −0.64uSz = 0
(3.1)
SINGULAR gives us the following Gro¨bner basis for the above system of polynomial equations
(see Appendix):
g1(z) = (2304ψ3 +11520ψ2 +18432ψ+9216)z2+
+(320ψ3σ −460ψ3 +1088ψ2σ −2588ψ2 +896ψσ −4616ψ−2560)z+
+25σψ3 +70σψ2 +49σψ−50ψ3−170ψ2−140ψ ;
g2(uY ,z) = (5ψσ +10σ)uY +(−36ψ−72)z−5ψσ +10ψ−7σ +20;
g3(uS,z) = 5σuS +36z−10;
g4(uC,z) = (100ψ+200)uC +(−64ψ−128)z−5ψ−7.
(3.2)
This means that the system (3.1) is equivalent to the simplified system:
g1(z) = g2(uY ,z) = g3(uS,z) = g4(uC,z) = 0.
We note that g1(z) is now a one-variable polynomial of degree two whose coefficients are
functions with variables ψ and σ . For the sake of simplicity, let us write g1(z) = Az2 +Bz+C,
g2(uY ,z) = DuY + Ez+ F and observe that A,D 6= 0. Solving g1(z) = 0 the system has the
following recursive form solution: 
z = −B±
√
B2−4AC
2A
uY =−Ez+FD
uS =− 365σ z+ 2σ
uC = 1625z+
5ψ+7
100ψ+200 .
9In 2010a, Kubler and Schmedders provide three examples of applications of Gro¨bner bases that prove the great
advantage of using this algorithm. The corresponding polynomial systems of the three models cannot be easily
analyzed with standard techniques. However, the computation of a Gro¨bner basis gives an equivalent system from
which one can get information.
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Figure 2: Region R for which zˉ is real and zˉ1 is real and positive
We can rewrite the system in the following way (after substituting the value of z in all equations):
z = −B±
√
B2−4AC
2A
uY = −2AF+BE∓E
√
B2−4AC
2AD
uS = 10A+18B∓18
√
B2−4AC
5σA
uC =
5ψA−32ψB+7A−64B±32(ψ+2)
√
B2−4AC
100ψA+200A
(3.3)
Our goal is to determine, for each ψ and σ , the number of real positive solutions for this
system.
We first analyze when z is real and positive. We need to study the sign of B2− 4AC, a
polynomial of degree 6 whose variables are the parameters ψ and σ .
The line in Figure 2, B2−4AC = 0, divides the plane into two regions. The one labeled by R
represents the set of (almost) all values of ψ and σ for which B2−4AC > 0, i.e. the region where
z is real, when 0<ψ < 1 and 0< σ < 10. These intervals for the social infrastructure parameters
are based on quite weak assumptions. The first one (0 < ψ < 1) means that social infrastructure
contributes (positively) to utility but weights less than consumption (which weights 1); thus
ψ measures the relative welfare-substitutability between social infrastructure and consumption.
The second interval (0 < σ < 10) means that social infrastructure preserves physical capital
(the main assumption of this article) – as 0 > σ would clearly be dismissed by data – and σ <
10 prevents the overall effect of social infrastructure share in the growth rate of capital from
exceeding one, i.e., 1 > ∂gK/∂uS > 0. This restriction also keeps the value of the overall effect
of social infrastructure in preserving physical capital within a reasonable interval, even though
for higher values of that interval it would be possible that the strength of the social infrastructure
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Figure 3: Region for which uC is real and positive, when z = z1
effect offsets the negative effect of depreciation.10 We will thus focus only in this “admissible”
region, where z takes real values.
Note that given any z > 0 (i.e. given general values of ψ,σ ∈ R), the system has at least
one real solution (z,uY ,uS,uC). We next examine the situation when this solution is positive and
determine how many positive solutions the system has.
One can easily check that A > 0 for all ψ and σ , and B < 0 in the region R. So, we conclude
that z1 = −B+
√
B2−4AC
2A is always positive for general values of ψ and σ in R.
If z1 ∈ R then from (3.3) it is easy to see that uY > 0 if and only if the numerator −2AF +
BE−E√B2−4AC > 0. The study of this function allows us to conclude that it is positive for
general values of ψ and σ in R.
The following step is to evaluate the sign of the variable uS when z = z1. As before, uS is
positive if and only if its numerator is positive. This holds in R and hence, there is a positive
solution uS > 0 in R.
Finally, from the expression obtained for uC, we see that uC > 0 if and only if 5ψA−32ψB+
7A− 64B± 32(ψ + 2)√B2−4AC > 0. Studying this two-variable function, we see that uC > 0
for general values of σ and ψ in the region R when z = z1 (Figure 3 shows the region where
uC > 0, clearly containing region R shown in Figure 2).
Now, let us study the case when z2 = −B−
√
B2−4AC
2A . Figure 4 shows us how the sign of
−B−√B2−4AC changes inside R.
We see that −B−√B2−4AC = 0 divides R into two smaller open regions. More precisely,
R1 = R∩{(σ ,ψ) ∈]0,10[×]0,1[:−B−
√
B2−4AC < 0}
10Below, we will note that uS would be around 0.3 even for values of σ approaching 10. This means that (1−σuS)
would reach −2 with σ = 10 As gK = YKP −
C
KP − δP(1−σuS), with the mentioned values and δP = 0.05, then
δP(1−σuS) =−0.1. This corresponds to add 10% (due to the effect of social infrastructure) to the gK , a quite high
and unreasonable value. With σ < 10 we limit the analysis to effects that are always lower than that.
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and
R2 = R∩{(σ ,ψ) ∈]0,10[×]0,1[:−B−
√
B2−4AC > 0}.
Therefore, z2 > 0 if and only if ψ and σ belong to the region R2. In this case, when we study the
sign of the corresponding uY (i.e., when z = z2) we have uY > 0 in R2 in Figure 4.11 Therefore,
there is another positive solution for uY when σ ,ψ ∈ R2 (the line dividing R1 and R2 describes
the set of points where uY = 0 in R).
Studying the functions defining uS and uC in the case when z = z2, we conclude that both are
positive for general values of σ ,ψ ∈ R2 (in fact, they are positive in R).
We can now conclude our study. For almost all ψ ,σ ∈ R1, the system (3.1) has a unique
positive solution: 
z = −B+
√
B2−4AC
2A
uY = −2AF+BE−E
√
B2−4AC
2AD
uS = 10A+18B−18
√
B2−4AC
5σA
uC =
5ψA−32ψB+7A−64B+32(ψ+2)
√
B2−4AC
100ψA+200A
For generic values of ψ and σ in the region R2, the system has two positive solutions:
z = −B+
√
B2−4AC
2A
uY = −2AF+BE−E
√
B2−4AC
2AD
uS = 10A+18B−18
√
B2−4AC
5σA
uC =
5ψA−32ψB+7A−64B+32(ψ+2)
√
B2−4AC
100ψA+200A
∨

z = −B−
√
B2−4AC
2A
uY = −2AF+BE+E
√
B2−4AC
2AD
uS = 10A+18B+18
√
B2−4AC
5σA
uC =
5ψA−32ψB+7A−64B−32(ψ+2)
√
B2−4AC
100ψA+200A
The most interesting result in this subsection is that we can define the regions in the space
(ψ ,σ ) in which the equilibrium is unique and the regions in which there are two different feasible
equilibria. Unicity of equilibria is obtained for low values of σ (. 2.8) and for almost all values
of ψ . We can observe this in Figure 4, where R1 is the region in which there is only a single
positive steady-state and R2 is the region in which there are two positive steady-states.
3.1.1 Finding the proper Subvariety z
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, there is a proper subvariety z⊂ R2 such that
when parameters ψ and σ take values outsidez, Gro¨bner basis behave nicely, i.e., the polynomi-
als obtained from g1, . . . ,g4 by choosing values for ψ and σ are still a Gro¨bner basis for the ideal
generated by the polynomials obtained from the original polynomials in equations (3.1). We will
determine z in order to ensure that the Gro¨bner basis defined above is the correct one for this
11It is sufficient to look at the numerator since the denominator is always positive. The same holds when we study
uS and uC.
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Figure 4: Region R2 for which z2 is real and positive
problem. This calculation is not straightforward, as the literature on the subject mentioned above
points out.
In Cox et al., 1997, Chapter 6, §3, exercises 7–9, we have a set of guidelines to compute
z, which we will follow here. In appendix, we present the code used in SINGULAR for these
computations.
Let f1, f2, f3, f4 be the polynomials
f1 = uC +(0.025ψ−0.025σ)uS +(0.025ψ)uY −0.82z−0.025ψ+0.015;
f2 = uC− (0.05+0.05σ)uS−0.05uY − z+0.1;
f3 = uC +(4/45σ −0.05)uS−0.05uY −8/45;
f4 = ψuCuY −0.64uSz.
Let I be the ideal of C(ψ,σ)[uC,uS,uY ,z] generated by the polynomials f1, f2, f3, and f4.
Consider the lexicographical ordering for monomials with
uC > uS > uY > z.
A reduced Gro¨bner basis (Cox et al., 1997, Chapter 2, §7, Definition 5) for the ideal I is
gˉ1 = z2 + 80σψ
2+112σψ−115ψ2−417ψ−320
576ψ2+1728ψ+1152 z+
25σψ3+70σψ2+49σψ−50ψ3−170ψ2−140ψ
2304ψ3+11520ψ2+18432ψ+9216 ;
gˉ2 = uY − 365σ z+ −5σψ−7σ+10ψ+205σψ+10σ ;
gˉ3 = uS + 365σ z− 2σ ;
gˉ4 = uC− 1625z− 5ψ+7100ψ+200 .
We can now see that f1, f2, and f3 are monic polynomials for the monomial ordering we
considered. If we divide f4 by ψ , we obtain a monic polynomial, as well. Being a reduced
Gro¨bner basis, polynomials gˉ1, gˉ2, gˉ3, and gˉ4 are also monic. Let us consider all denominators
present in the coefficients of polynomials f1, f2, f3, 1ψ f4, gˉ1, gˉ2, gˉ3, and gˉ4 (coefficients are
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elements of C(ψ ,σ)). They are:
d1 = ψ; d4 = 5σ ;
d2 = 576ψ2 +1728ψ+1152; d5 = 5σψ+10σ ;
d3 = 2304ψ3+11520ψ2+18432ψ+9216; d6 = 100ψ+200.
When we consider these polynomials in the ring C[ψ ,σ ], their least common multiple can
be computed using library poly.lib (Bachmann et al., 2012) in SINGULAR. It is
d = σψ(ψ3 +5ψ2 +8ψ+4).
Now let ˜I be the ideal of C[uC,uS,uY ,z,φ ,σ ] generated by the polynomials f1, f2, f3, and f4.
Now observe that the polynomials we obtain by clearing denominators in gˉ1, gˉ2, gˉ3, and gˉ4 are
precisely g1, g2, g3, and g4, respectively, the Gro¨bner basis we obtained in (3.2).
By computing a Gro¨bner basis for ˜I, we can easily see that all polynomials g1, g2, g3, and g4
are in ˜I, and we can therefore conclude that if z is the variety defined by d in R2, then for all
(ψ ,σ) ∈ R2 \z the Gro¨bner basis specializes well.
Note that d vanishes for σ = 0, ψ = 0 or negative values of ψ . All these values are excluded
in the present context, so for the values relevant herein, the Gro¨bner basis computed above will
specialize well.
3.2 Steady-State for a Varying Effect of Social Infrastructure on Invest-
ment (σ )
The main focus of this paper is to study an endogenous growth model in which we incorporate an
effect of social infrastructure in preserving physical capital. Thus, we wish to detail the steady-
state solutions for some given values of the effect of social infrastructure in utility (ψ) and only
for a varying effect of social infrastructure in investment (σ ). We use three values for ψ : 0.5,0.1,
and 0.9.
Replacing ψ = 0.5 in system (3.1) and computing its Gro¨bner basis is the same as replacing
it in the Gro¨bner basis above, as we saw in the last section. It yields the following:
g1(z) = 172800z2 +(6080σ −44580)z+361σ −950
g2(uY ,z) =−25σuY +180z+19σ −50
g3(uS,z) =−5σuS−36z+10
g4(uC,z) = 500uC−320z−19
(3.4)
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The solution of this system is:
z = −304σ+2229±
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
17280
uY = 365σ z− 50−19σ25σ
uS =− 365σ z+ 2σ
uC = 1625z+
19
500
or, equivalently: 
z = −304σ+2229±
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
17280
uY = 1520σ−2571±
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
2400σ
uS = 304σ+2571∓
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
2400σ
uC = −304σ+3255±
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
27000
Comparing equilibria in the case in which they both exist, we can see that one is character-
ized with a higher allocation of human capital to the final good production and high consumption
to capital ratio while the economy invests less in social infrastructure, while the other is charac-
terized by lower allocation to the final good production and consumption and better institutional
environment. There is thus a trade-off between present and future, determined by the allocation
of human resources to build social infrastructure. In Figure 5, we see that for σ ∈ R1 = ]0;a[,
where a≈ 2.6316, there is exactly one positive solution z, namely:
z = −304σ+2229+
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
17280 ,
whereas when σ ∈ R2 = ]a;b[, where b≈ 4.1406, there are two possible positive solutions:
z = −304σ+2229±
√
92416σ2−1979040σ+6610041
17280 .
When σ ∈ ]b;10[, z is a complex solution. Furthermore, we see which values z takes when σ
varies between 0 and 10. The graphs in Figure 5 show the values for z, uY , uS, and uC.
Note that all results obtained are coherent with those obtained in the previous section. Sup-
pose that σ ∈ R1 =]0;a[. In this case, the only z > 0 determines a unique admissible solution of
the system, (z,uY ,uS,uC), although the graphs in Figure 5 show us that there are two possible
positive solutions for uS and uC (recall from the previous section that when z = z1 all variables
are positive for all (σ ,ψ) ∈ R1; but when z = z2 only uS and uC are positive for all (σ ,ψ) ∈ R1).
On the other hand, if σ ∈ R2 = ]a;b[, we are able to check in Figure 5 that a horizontal line
above the line σ = a and below σ = b intersects z, uY , uS, and uC at two points. This means that
there are two solutions for the system (3.4).
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Figure 5: Real and Positive solutions of z, uY , uS and uC (respectively) for σ ∈ ]0;10[ andψ = 0.5.
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Looking at Figure 5 gives us an idea about how reasonable this exercise is. In fact, we obtain
an allocation of human capital to the final good that can be at most 0.5, an allocation of human
capital to social infrastructure that can be around 0.3 (in the unique equilibrium or in one of the
equilibria when there are two) and a consumption to capital ratio can be just above zero or nearly
0.2, which are quite reasonable values. When analyzing the implications of the two equilibria
solution, we easily reach the conclusion that the country with higher uS, lower uY , uC, and z
would also have a lower Y/KP. Whether the country with higher social infrastructure would
have a higher income level than the one with lower infrastructure would depend on the level of
KP. However, this level would depend on, among other things, the efforts countries had made
in order to improve σ , since an increase in σ will increase the growth rate of capital above the
steady-state level and ultimately determine the income level of the country in each period. This
draws attention to the study of transitional dynamics effects, which we present below.
The cases when ψ = 0.1 and ψ = 0.9 are studied in similar ways and give results that are
analogous to the case when ψ = 0.5. The Gro¨bner bases are, respectively:
g1(z) = 1241856z2 +(11200σ −338660)z+625σ −1750
g2(uY ,z) =−35σuY +252z+25σ −70
g3(uS,z) =−5σuS−36z+10
g4(uC,z) = 700uC−448z−25
(3.5)
and
g1(z) = 36815616z2 +(1920960σ −9146020)z+119025σ −300150
g2(uY ,z) =−145σuY +1044z+115σ −290
g3(uS,z) =−5σuS−36z+10
g4(uC,z) = 2900uC−1856z−115
(3.6)
When ψ = 0.1, the solution of the system is:
z = −2800σ+84665±5
√
313600σ2−26726560σ+308458969
620928
uY = 11760σ−17563±
√
313600σ2−26726560σ+308458969
17248σ
uS = 560σ+17563∓
√
313600σ2−26726560σ+308458969
17248σ
uC = −560σ+23863±
√
313600σ2−26726560σ+308458969
194040
For σ ∈ ]0;10[, z is always a real number. In this case, we have R1 = ]0;c[, with c≈ 2.8, and
the system has only one positive solution, and R2 = ]c;10[, where we find two positive solutions
of the system.
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When ψ = 0.9, the solution of the system is
z = −480240σ+2286505±5
√
9225218304σ2−131665479840σ+319626276025
18407808
uY = 309488σ−565355±
√
9225218304σ2−131665479840σ+319626276025
511328σ
uS = 96048σ+565355∓
√
9225218304σ2−131665479840σ+319626276025
511328σ
uC = −96048σ+685415±
√
9225218304σ2−131665479840σ+319626276025
5752440
Now, R1 = ]0;d[, where d ≈ 2.5217, and R2 = ]d;e[, where e ≈ 3.1015. For σ ∈ R1 the system
has only one positive solution, while for σ ∈ R2 there are two positive solutions. For σ ∈ ]e;10[,
z is not a real number.
This section divides the space of the effect of social infrastructure on investment according to
the existence of steady-state and its unicity. There is unicity of the steady-state when the effect
of social infrastructure on investment is relatively low (0 < σ < 3) and there are two feasible
equilibria for values of σ greater than 3. The precise value of σ below which there is a unique
equilibrium does not change much when the weight of social infrastructure in utility changes
from 0.1 to 0.9.
Given the results obtained so far we can summarize them in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For different weights of social infrastructure in utility (0.1; 0.5 and 0.9), there
are one steady-state for relatively low effect of social infrastructure in capital accumulation or
two steady-states for relatively higher effect of social infrastructure in capital accumulation.
Proof. In the text above.
3.3 Stability
In this section we wish to study the stability around the steady-states presented above. This is
important in order to know if the system converges to the steady-state, once deviating from it
temporarily. To this end we linearize the system (2.21) around the steady-state (v∗H ,u∗Y ,u∗C) and
obtain the following:
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
∙
vH
∙
uY
∙
uC
=

uC +
uCuY (1−τ)ψ(ξψ−δPσ)
z(1−β ) J12 J13
vH − u
β
Y v
β
H(ξ+δPσ)ψ
(1−β ) J22 J23
−uY
(
1− uYψϒz(1−β )β
)
−uCu
1+β
Y v
−2+β
H ϒψβ ξuY + uCuYϒψz(1−β )

vH − v
∗
H
uY −u∗Y
uC−u∗C
 , (3.7)
J12 =−uCz/vH(1−β )(1−βτ)−u2CuβY v−2+βH (1− τ)ψ(ξψ−δPσ);
J13 = uC
(
−z/uY (1−β )(1−βτ)+ξ (1− τ)ψ+ uCβ (1− τ)ψ(ξψ−δPσ)(1−β )z
)
;
J22 =−z(1−β )+uCuY/z(ξ +δPσ)ψ ;
J23 =−u−βY v2−βH (1−β )−ξvH− uCvHβ (ξ +δPσ)ψz(1−β ) ;
z = v1−βH u
1−β
Y ;
ϒ= (βξ − (1−β )δPσ).
or
∙
X= J(X−X∗), where J is the Jacobian in (3.7), Ji j are the elements of the Jacobian and X is
the vector of variables. To demonstrate the conditions under which the system is stable we use
the Routh-Hurwitz theorem.
Using the Routh-Hurwitz theorem, the number of stable roots is equal to the number of
variations of sign in the scheme:
1 tr( ˉJ) B ˉJ ≡ Δ−det( ˉJ)/tr( ˉJ) det( ˉJ)
where Δ= J11 J22 − J12 J21 + J22 J33 − J32 J23 + J11 J33 − J13 J31.
We now show that a sufficient condition to rule out the case of non-existing stable roots is that
tr( ˉJ) > 0 and det( ˉJ) < 0, noting that if this were to happen we would obtain just one variation
in sign independent of the sign of B ˉJ. Thus, the determinant and trace are respectively:
det( ˉJ) = − ξβ (1+(1− τ)ψ)
(
(1−β )βuCzuY +ψβu2CuY +ψδPσuCu2Y ((1−β )−uC/z)
)
:
tr( ˉJ) = uC +(ξuY − (1−β )z)+ uCu
β
Y v
−1+β
H ψ(ξ +(1− τ)(ξψ−δPσ))
1−β .
Thus we can write the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. For ξuY > (1−β )z > uC and ξψ > δPσ , the steady-states are stable.
Proof. Note that in the conditions of the Proposition, tr( ˉJ) > 0 and det( ˉJ) < 0.
For the calibration values used above, we reach the conditions 0.05uY > 0.64z > uC and
ψ > σ . These sufficient conditions are stated for their simplicity; however, we must note that,
given our experiments, the steady-state is saddle-path for many parameter combinations that do
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not respect the sufficient conditions stated above. For instance, we ran an exercise in which we
analyzed the eigenvalues of that system from σ = 0 to σ = 10, with steps of 0.1 between 0 and 1
and steps of 1 between 1 and 10, for the three cases ψ = 0.1, ψ = 0.5, and ψ = 0.9. We always
reached one or two eigenvalues with a negative real part which point out to determinate stability
or indeterminate stability. Saddle-path determinate stability always occurs for the low effect of
social infrastructure in utility (ψ = 0.1) and also occurs for ψ = 0.5 and for ψ = 0.9 for low
values of the effect of social infrastructure on investment. An interesting feature of the situation
in which social infrastructure is heavily weighted in utility (ψ = 0.9) is that convergence to the
steady-state tends to be oscillatory for values of σ > 3, as complex conjugate values for the
stable eigenvalues were found for those combinations of parameters.
4 Simulation
In this section we present the results of a simulation for the model economy when the value
of our crucial parameter, σ , is changed.12 We perform two exercises, one in which σ changes
from 0.1 to 0.25 and another in which σ changes from 1 to 1.1. These changes fit in the regions
obtained for feasible steady-states and are illustrative exercises. However, we conclude that for
several combinations of parameters, the transitional dynamics in this model is very similar. We
conclude, in particular, that the transitional dynamics obtained have only minor relevance when
compared with steady-state differences in this model. This means that convergence speed is quite
high and the economy takes at most 25 years to arrive at the new steady-state. This conclusion
supports our complete study of the steady-state properties of the model stated above.
We conclude this section by presenting welfare effects of changes in σ for several combina-
tions of parameters σ and ψ . It is important to look at welfare effects to complete the charac-
terization of the model as there is a trade-off between consumption and social infrastructure in
this economy. Since an increase in social infrastructure increases utility, it also increases invest-
ment. This rise in investment may decrease consumption in the short run. Thus, it is important to
measure the relative importance of this short-run negative effect of improving social infrastruc-
ture. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the main variables from a steady-state with σ = 0.1 to a
steady-state with σ = 0.25 for ψ = 0.5. In the Figure, we present macroeconomic variables such
as growth rates for consumption (gC), capital (gKP), and output (gY ), the shares of human capital
allocated to the final good sector, the human capital accumulation sector, and to social capital
(uY , uH , and uS, respectively), and the human capital to physical capital ratio (vH).
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the main variables from a steady-state in which σ = 1.0 to a
steady-state in which σ = 1.1 for ψ = 0.5.
Once the effect of social infrastructure in preserving physical capital increases, the vH =
KH/KP drops, as investment in physical capital begins. This increase in investment is shown
in the figure, since gK increases more than 0.5% in both exercises. The investment growth
12We use the Relaxation Algorithm from Trimborn et al. (2008).
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Figure 6: Time paths of representative variables in the model from a steady-state with σ = 0.1
to a steady-state with σ = 0.25.
Note: Parameter values are shown at the beginning of the previous section, ψ = 0.5. Solid black line
refers to the final steady-state and the dashed black line refers to the initial steady-state.
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Figure 7: Time paths of representative variables in the model from a steady-state with σ = 1.0
to a steady-state with σ = 1.1.
Note: Parameter values are shown at the beginning of the previous section, ψ = 0.5. Solid black line
refers to the final steady-state and the dashed black line refers to the initial steady-state.
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Figure 8: Time paths of consumption and social infrastructure in the model from a steady-state
with σ = 0.1 to a steady-state with σ = 0.25 and from a steady-state with σ = 1.0 to a steady-
state with σ = 1.1.
Note: Parameter values are shown at the beginning of the previous section, ψ = 0.5. Dashed black lines
indicate the final value.
rate stands above its steady-state level for nearly 10 years. This increase in the growth rate
of physical capital is followed by the growth rates for consumption and output. However, the
increase of the growth rate of consumption stands below the rise in the physical capital growth
rate, which is the cause for the drop of the consumption to capital ratio (uC). In Figure 6, with
a lower effect of social infrastructure in preserving physical capital, the share of human capital
allocated to social infrastructure activities first decreases (nearly 0.025%) and then increases to
a level that is slightly above the initial steady-state value. This corresponds to an initial increase
of human capital allocated to the final good (uY ), with an almost constant share of human capital
in education. This transitional higher allocation of human capital to the production of final
good matches the higher investment in physical capital. In Figure 7, however, with a greater
effect of social infrastructure in preserving physical capital, we observe a higher drop in vH , and
consequently, a higher effect of increasing protection (due to social infrastructure) in investment.
Transitional dynamic analysis also reveals that the compensation to increase allocation to the
final good production due to strengthening of social infrastructure effect in the economy comes
at the expense of allocations to social infrastructure, with minor effects on education.
The intuition behind the transition path for the variables is maintained for exercises in which
ψ = 0.1 and ψ = 0.9.
We also wish to calculate the effect of this rise in σ on welfare. For that we must first cal-
culate a series for consumption C and for the allocation of human capital to social infrastructure
activities, HS, both of which influence utility. Thus this measure takes all of the transitional dy-
namics into account. Figure 8 shows the evolution of both variables compared with their initial
values (each variable assumes value 1 in the initial steady state).
25
From Figure 8 we see that there are interesting trade-offs between short and long-run effects
that will influence welfare. In both exercises, both consumption and investment in social infras-
tructure face a short-run negative effect that may be compensated for by a positive effect in the
long-run.
Table 1 shows the long-run variations in consumption, in investment in social infrastructure,
and in welfare that result from increasing the effect of social infrastructure in protecting invest-
ment.
Table 1 - Long-run Effects (%) of Institutional Change in Consumption (C), Social Infrastructure (Hs),
and Welfare (W)
σ = 0.1→ σ = 0.25 σ = 1.0→ σ = 1.10
ψ = 0.1 ΔC = 0.39;ΔHS= 0.07;ΔW = 0.48 ΔC = 0.28;ΔHS= 0.05;ΔW = 0.39
ψ = 0.5 ΔC = 1.52;ΔHS= 0.26;ΔW = 1.16 ΔC = 1.26;ΔHS= 0.26;ΔW = 0.91
ψ = 0.9 ΔC = 2.26;ΔHS= 0.40;ΔW = 1.58 ΔC = 2.05;ΔHS= 0.46;ΔW = 1.28
These values indicate a considerable effect on welfare of small variations in the parameter
that governs the effect of social infrastructure (σ ), effects that oscillate from 0.39% to 1.58%.
The welfare effects depend positively and monotonically on the weight of social infrastructure
in the utility. Interestingly, the effect on consumption of increasing σ is greater than the effect
on social infrastructure (HS).
5 Conclusion
Following the important literature on institutions and growth, the model in this paper considers
that social infrastructure is a specific type of human capital, which allows for preserving physical
capital.
Due to the polynomial structure and complexity of the model, we use an innovative method-
ology in economics, the Gro¨bner basis, to characterize the feasibility of the steady-state. We
conclude that for different regions of the crucial parameters space, two feasible or a unique
steady-state could emerge. In particular, unicity is ensured when the effect of social infrastruc-
ture in preserving investment is particularly low. When this happens, the steady-state always
predicts reasonable values for the shares of human capital allocated to the final good production,
education, and social infrastructure. When there are two different steady-states, one is character-
ized by a higher allocation of human capital to the final good production and high consumption to
capital ratio while investing less in social infrastructure, and the other is characterized by lower
allocation of human capital to the final good production and consumption and better institutional
environment. There is thus a trade-off between present and future determined by allocation of hu-
man resources to build social infrastructure. For reasonable intervals of the social infrastructure
weight in utility and social infrastructure effect in investment, steady-states are stable, saddle-
path or indeterminate, and convergence around the steady-state may be monotonic or oscillatory.
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Thus, the model that incorporates the role of social infrastructure in preserving physical capital
shows a rich set of outcomes.
We also studied transitional dynamics of an economy that strengthens social infrastructure.
During the transition path the economy faces a trade-off between the final good production and
investment in social infrastructure, inducing a phase of relatively higher transitional growth.
To summarize, our paper presents an alternative modelling of the effect of social infrastruc-
ture on economic growth, through linking social infrastructure with human capital effort which
acts on physical capital investment. We conclude for a crucial effect of the quality of social in-
frastructure (measured by the effect of social infrastructure on investment) on determining if the
economy has a unique or two feasible steady-states and whether they are or not stable. Finally,
we showed that, for a reasonable calibration set of values for parameters, strengthening the effect
of social infrastructure in investment is welfare-improving.
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Supplementary Material
Let x = uC, y = uS, z = uY , w = z, e = ψ and f = σ . To compute a Gro¨bner basis for the ideal
defined by the polynomials of the system (3.1) in section 3 we introduce the following commands
in SINGULAR:
ring R=(0,e,f),(x,y,z,w),lp;
option(redSB);
poly f1=x+(25/1000*e-25/1000*f)*y+25/1000*e*z-82/100*w-25/1000*e+15/1000;
poly f2=x-(5/100+5/100*f)*y-5/100*z-w+1/10;
poly f3=x+(4/45*f-5/100)*y-5/100*z-8/45;
poly f4=e*x*z-64/100*y*w;
ideal I=f1,f2,f3,f4;
ideal G=groebner(I);
G;
Then, to compute the polynomial d that defines the variety F (section 3.1.1) we introduce the
following commands in SINGULAR:
poly g1red = G[1]/leadcoef(G[1]);
poly g2red = G[2]/leadcoef(G[2]);
poly g3red = G[3]/leadcoef(G[3]);
poly g4red = G[4]/leadcoef(G[4]);
ring R=0,(x,y,z,w,f,e),dp;
option(redSB);
poly f1 = x + 1/40*(e-f)*y + 1/40ez - 41/50w - 1/40e + 3/200;
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poly f2 = x - 1/20*(1+f)*y - 1/20z - w + 1/10;
poly f3 = x + (4/45f-1/20)*y - 1/20z - 8/45;
poly f4 = exz - 16/25yw;
ideal II = f1, f2, f3, f4;
ideal sII = groebner(II);
poly d1 = e;
poly d2 = 576e2+1728e+1152;
poly d3 = 2304e3+11520e2+18432e+9216;
poly d4 = 5f;
poly d5 = 5fe+10f;
poly d6 = 100e+200;
LIB "poly.lib";
poly d = lcm(d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6);
poly d7 = d/leadcoef(d);
poly t1 = d7*((2304e3+11520e2+18432e
+9216)*w2+(320fe3+1088fe2+896fe-460e3-2588e2-4616e-2560)*w
+(25fe3+70fe2+49fe-50e3-170e2-140e));
poly t2 = d7*((5fe+10f)*z+(-36e-72)*w+(-5fe-7f+10e+20));
poly t3 = d7*((5f)*y+36*w-10);
poly t4 = d7*((100e+200)*x+(-64e-128)*w+(-5e-7));
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reduce(t1,sI);
reduce(t2,sI);
reduce(t3,sI);
reduce(t4,sI);
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